Hospital Reimbursement in an Oligopolistic Industry
This paper analyses the design of hospital reimbursement in an industry with imperfect competition, scarcity of labour and socially costly government transfers. We find that prospective payment not only increases the quantity of hospital care, but also the quality if quality improvements are valued sufficiently high by the patients.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
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