Subsiding Private Contributions to a Pure Public Good: A Diagrammatic Analysis
This paper uses the geometric analysis in Cornes and Sandler to demonstrate the Lindahl equilibrium when private contributions are subsidised in a non-cooperative setting i.e., in a setting where consumers take as constant the contributions by all others when making their own.
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Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm
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