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Market Organization: Noocooperative Models of Coalition Formation

Author

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  • Thoron, S.

Abstract

I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more players depart (which we shall refer to as "depleted coalition").

Suggested Citation

  • Thoron, S., 1999. "Market Organization: Noocooperative Models of Coalition Formation," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a30, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:99a30
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    Cited by:

    1. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAME THEORY ; OLIGOPOLIES ; MARKET STRUCTURE;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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