The Gains from Forming a Joint Venture in a New Market with Rivals in an Existing Market: the Bertrand Case
We show that under Bertrand competition, firms may have an incentive to transfer real ressources to a joint venture operating in an unrelated market. The optimal transfers are typically asymmetric, in order to reduce the extent of rivalry in the oligopoly.
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