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Cooperation and Endogenous Identity


  • Vittorio Emanuele Ferrante

    () (Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università degli studi di Firenze)


We consider individual identity as abstract common social kinship, and model it as the fuzzy degree of membership to sets of individuals. We connect identity to propensity of cooperation as modeled by a Prisoners' Dilemma game played in pairs of individuals in a mixed population of cooperators and defectors. Unlike in standard evolutionary game theory, individuals are identified with set dependant strategies; their fuzzy identity is adjusted in reaction to success/insuccess as measured by relative payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Vittorio Emanuele Ferrante, 2012. "Cooperation and Endogenous Identity," Working Papers - Economics wp2012_26.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2012_26.rdf

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    fuzzy identity; cooperation; evolutionary game theory.;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification


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