Modelling the role of credit rating agencies - Do they spark off a virtuous circle?
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- Dion Bongaerts & K. J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2012.
"Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 113-152, February.
- Dion Bongaerts & Martijn Cremers & William Goetzmann, 2008. "Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2394, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Sep 2009.
- Dion Bongaerts & K.J. Martijn Cremers & William N. Goetzmann, 2009. "Tiebreaker: Certification and Multiple Credit Ratings," NBER Working Papers 15331, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Keywordsinformation production; rating agencies; coordination problems; global game;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
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