IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing Under Uncertainty: Does it Reduce Inefficient Credit Decisions?


  • Christina E. Bannier



Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm's-length bank lending. This paper explores the reasons for the dominance of such heterogeneous multiple bank financing. We show that the incidence of inefficient credit termination decreases in the relationship bank's information precision for firms with low expected cash-flows, but increases for firms with high expected profits. Generally, however, heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to fewer inefficient credit decisions than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing, provided that the relationship bank's fraction of total firm debt is not too large.

Suggested Citation

  • Christina E. Bannier, 2005. "Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing Under Uncertainty: Does it Reduce Inefficient Credit Decisions?," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 149, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
  • Handle: RePEc:fra:franaf:149

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kahn, Charles M & McAndrews, James & Roberds, William, 2003. " Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 591-608, August.
    2. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2014. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 10.
    3. De Bandt, Olivier & Hartmann, Philipp, 2000. "Systemic risk: A survey," Working Paper Series 0035, European Central Bank.
    4. Ian Giddy & Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter, 1996. "Alternative models for clearance and settlement: the case of the single European capital market," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 986-1003.
    5. Tapking, Jens & Yang, Jing, 2006. "Horizontal and Vertical Integration in Securities Trading and Settlement," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(7), pages 1765-1795, October.
    6. Egon Franck & Carola Jungwirth, 2003. "Reconciling Rent-Seekers and Donators – The Governance Structure of Open Source," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(4), pages 401-421, December.
    7. Bénédicte Vidaillet & V. D'Estaintot & P. Abécassis, 2005. "Introduction," Post-Print hal-00287137, HAL.
    8. Giddy, Ian & Saunders, Anthony & Walter, Ingo, 1996. "Alternative Models for Clearance and Settlement: The Case of the Single European Capital Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 28(4), pages 986-1000, November.
    9. Schmiedel, Heiko & Malkamaki, Markku & Tarkka, Juha, 2006. "Economies of scale and technological development in securities depository and settlement systems," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1783-1806, June.
    10. Hasan, Iftekhar & Malkamaki, Markku, 2001. "Are expansions cost effective for stock exchanges? A global perspective," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(12), pages 2339-2366, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fra:franaf:149. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Reinhard H. Schmidt). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.