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Risk aversion and credit access: Solving financial exclusion through contract innovation

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  • Ambler, Kate
  • Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab
  • de Brauw, Alan
  • Uddin, Mohammad Riad

Abstract

Credit market failures may reflect voluntary withdrawal by risk-averse borrowers in addition to supply-side constraints. We conduct a randomized trial with 1,517 Bangladeshi households, offering cattle financing through conventional loans or profit-sharing contracts that spread risk between the farmer and the financial partner. Overall, interest in and take-up of the profit-sharing contracts were modestly higher than the conventional loans. However, conventional loan take-up was much lower among risk-averse farmers, and profit-sharing eliminated the take-up gap between risk-averse and non-risk-averse farmers. We find that it is male risk preferences that are associated with these decisions even when contracts explicitly target women. Livestock investment increases under both contracts with no evidence of moral hazard under profit-sharing.

Suggested Citation

  • Ambler, Kate & Bakhtiar, M. Mehrab & de Brauw, Alan & Uddin, Mohammad Riad, 2026. "Risk aversion and credit access: Solving financial exclusion through contract innovation," IFPRI discussion papers 2404, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    • Handle: RePEc:fpr:ifprid:181679
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/10568/181679
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