European Monetary Integration
In this paper I seek to establish four points:- (1) EMU will be a much tighter and more ambitious regime than the gold standard. (2) Should,d misalignment occur under EMU, it could lead to considerable political tension, since most of the short-term economic safety valves are of limited efficacy. (3) While a single currency certainly supports a single market, the claim that the former is necessary for the latter is contentious. (4) Not only would some well-designed federal fiscal stabilisation help to maintain a single currency, especially on political grounds, but also a single currency could reduce national objections to greater fiscal federalism.
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- von Hagen, Jurgen & Hammond, George W, 1998.
"Regional Insurance against Asymmetric Shocks: An Empirical Study for the European Community,"
The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies,
University of Manchester, vol. 66(3), pages 331-353, June.
- Hammond, George & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Regional Insurance Against Asymmetric Shocks. An Empirical Study for the European Community," CEPR Discussion Papers 1170, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991.
"Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States,"
NBER Working Papers
3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Oskar Morgenstern, 1959. "International Financial Transactions and Business Cycles," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morg59-1, December.
- Melitz, Jacques & Vori, Silvia, 1992.
"National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
697, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jacques MÉLITZ & Silvia VORI, 1993. "National Insurance against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1993014, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Michele Fratianni & Franco Spinelli, 1984. "Italy in the Gold Standard Period, 1861-1914," NBER Chapters,in: A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931, pages 405-454 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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