IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes

Listed author(s):
  • José Viñals
  • Charles Goodhart

    ()

Registered author(s):

    What we shall concentrate on in this paper is the way in which the strategy and tactics of monetary policy are currently being articulated in this current context. We document in Section 2, the common adoption of price stability as the overriding priority. This does not, however, prevent the adoption of subsidiary objectives. While price stability has now been generally accepted as the dominant objective for Central Banks monetary policy, the term `price stability has most often not been defined, either legislatively or in practice. We shall discuss some possible alternative definitions, and the pros and cons of adopting them in this Section, eg the choice of index and whether the objective should be expressed in terms of a price level, or rate of inflation (eg zero).

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/specialPapers/1990s/sp61.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Financial Markets Group in its series FMG Special Papers with number sp61.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: Aug 1994
    Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp61
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981.
    2. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216.
    3. Glasner,David, 1989. "Free Banking and Monetary Reform," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521361750, October.
    4. Carl E. Walsh, 1994. "Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an optimal central bank contract?," Pacific Basin Working Paper Series 94-01, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    5. William Poole, 1969. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Special Studies Papers 2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Leland B. Yeager & Robert L. Greenfield, 1989. "Can Monetary Disequilibrium Be Eliminated?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 9(2), pages 405-428, Fall.
    7. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    8. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1993. "The Unstable EMS," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 24(1), pages 51-144.
    9. Ben Bernanke & Frederic Mishkin, 1992. "Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations From Six Industrialized Countries," NBER Working Papers 4082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Schnadt, Norbert & Whittaker, John, 1993. "Inflation-Proof Currency? The Feasibility of Variable Commodity Standards," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 214-21, May.
    11. Carl E. Walsh, 1994. "Central bank independence and the costs of disinflation in the EC," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-04, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    12. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-592, June.
    13. George A. Selgin, 1990. "Monetary Equilibrium and the Productivity Norm of Price-Level Policy," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 10(1), pages 265-287, Spring/Su.
    14. Hiroshi Shibuya, 1992. "Dynamic Equilibrium Price Index: Asset Price and Inflation," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 10(1), pages 95-109, February.
    15. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp61. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (The FMG Administration)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.