The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe
This paper examines the unfinished agenda of the governance structure for financial regulation and supervision in Europe. In this unfinished agenda, there are two opposite forces at play: one that fosters greater centralisation and another one that promotes decentralisation with co-operation. I try to cast some light on this debate, by arguing that a single market with a single currency does need some common rules, but does not require a single supervisor. I also argue that the possible centralisation of one function (lender of last resort) does not imply nor require the centralisation of other supervisory functions.
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