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The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe

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  • Rosa M. Lastra

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  • Dr Rosa Lastra

Abstract

This paper examines the unfinished agenda of the governance structure for financial regulation and supervision in Europe. In this unfinished agenda, there are two opposite forces at play: one that fosters greater centralisation and another one that promotes decentralisation with co-operation. I try to cast some light on this debate, by arguing that a single market with a single currency does need some common rules, but does not require a single supervisor. I also argue that the possible centralisation of one function (lender of last resort) does not imply nor require the centralisation of other supervisory functions.

Suggested Citation

  • Rosa M. Lastra & Dr Rosa Lastra, 2003. "The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe," FMG Special Papers sp149, Financial Markets Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp149
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    File URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/specialPapers/2003/sp149.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Chagas Goudard, Gustavo & Bittes Terra, Fábio Henrique, 2015. "Macroprudential policy: an institutionalist interpretation," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    2. Garry J. Schinasi & Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, 2006. "The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Cross-Border Banking Regulatory Challenges, chapter 23, pages 349-372 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Elisabetta Montanaro, 2016. "The process towards centralisation of the European financial supervisory architecture: The case of the Banking Union," PSL Quarterly Review, Economia civile, vol. 69(277), pages 135-172.
    4. Kenneth Sullivan, 2008. "Presentación proactiva del desempeño," Boletín, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 130-135, Julio-sep.
    5. Jan Kolesnik, 2013. "Europejska unia bankowa – nowy wymiar ryzyka systemowego. (European Banking Union – a new dimension of systemic risk.)," Problemy Zarzadzania, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 11(42), pages 91-111.
    6. Gualandri, Elisabetta & Grasso, Alessandro Giovanni, 2006. "Towards a new Approach to Regulation and Supervision in the EU: Post-FSAP and Comitology," MPRA Paper 1780, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Edgardo Demaestri & Gustavo Ferro, 2013. "Analysis of the Integration of Financial Regulation and Supervision to the Central Bank," Ensayos Económicos, Central Bank of Argentina, Economic Research Department, vol. 1(68), pages 75-106, June.
    8. Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), 2011. "Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14064.
    9. Jakob De Haan & Fabian Amtenbrink, 2011. "Credit Rating Agencies," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 19 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Jörg Bibow, 2015. "The euro's savior? Assessing the ECB's crisis management performance and potential for crisis resolution," IMK Studies 42-2015, IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, Macroeconomic Policy Institute.
    11. Banco Central Europeo, 2008. "La titulización en la zona del euro," Boletín, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, vol. 0(3), pages 136-149, Julio-sep.
    12. Jorg Bibow, 2015. "The Euro's Savior? Assessing the ECB's Crisis Management Performance and Potential for Crisis Resolution," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_845, Levy Economics Institute.

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