Asset returns with earnings management
The paper investigates stock return dynamics in an environment where executives have an incentive to maximize their compensation by artificially inflating earnings. A principal-agent model with financial reporting and managerial effort is embedded in a Lucas asset-pricing model with periodic revelations of the firm's underlying profitability. The return process generated from the model is consistent with a range of financial anomalies observed in the return data: volatility clustering, asymmetric volatility, and increased idiosyncratic volatility. The calibration results further indicate that earnings management by individual firms does not only deliver the observed features in their own stocks, but can also be strong enough to generate market-wide patterns.
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- Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
- Detemple, Jerome B, 1986. " Asset Pricing in a Production Economy with Incomplete Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(2), pages 383-91, June.
- Jonathan C. Glover & Anil Arya & Shyam NMI Sunder, 1999. "Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm120, Yale School of Management.
- Jamsheed Shorish & Stephen E. Spear, 2005.
"Shaking the tree: an agency-theoretic model of asset pricing,"
Annals of Finance,
Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 51-72, 01.
- Jamsheed Shorish & Stephen Spear, . "Shaking the Tree: An Agency Theoretic Model of Asset Pricing," GSIA Working Papers 2003-E19, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Lacker, Jeffrey M. & Levy, Robert J. & Weinberg, John A., 1990. "Incentive compatible financial contracts, asset prices, and the value of control," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 31-56, March.
- Anil Arya & Shyam Sunder & Jonathan Glover, 2002. "Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm295, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2003.
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