Research and development with asymmetric firm sizes
This article presents a theoretical model of research and development (R&D) competition among firms. The goal of the model is to simultaneously explain two empirical observations pertaining to the persistence of dominant firms: small firms make a disproportionate share of major innovations, while large firms tend to spend more (in absolute terms) on R&D than small firms do. In the model here, firms choose investment levels and R&D project riskiness. In equilibrium, a large firm invests more than a smaller firm but, by choosing safer R&D projects, makes fewer major innovations.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1988|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/fedsorder.html|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kris Vajs)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.