A Large Poisson Currency Crises Game: Towards a Theory of Both the Onset and the Swiftness of Currency Attacks
Existing models of self-fulfilling crises fail to explain both the onset and the abruptness of recent currency attacks. In this apper we follow the suggestion by Myerson (1998) that in games with a very large number of players 'a more realistic model should admit some uncertainty about the number of players in the game.' In particular, we build a Large Poisson Currency Crises Game which turns out to be consistent with sudden attacks and unique equilibrium.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
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