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Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Lucy F. Ackert
  • Ann B. Gillette
  • Mark Rider

Abstract

This study sheds light on the difficulties people face in cooperating to resist coercion. We adapt a threshold public goods game to investigate whether people are able to cooperate to resist coercion despite individual incentives to free-ride. Behavior in this resistance game is similar to that observed in multi-period public goods games. Specifically, we observe "out-of-equilibrium" outcomes and a decrease in successful resistance in later periods of a session compared to earlier ones. Nevertheless, cooperation remains relatively high even in the later periods. Finally, we find that increasing the resistance threshold has a substantial negative effect on the probability of successful resistance.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucy F. Ackert & Ann B. Gillette & Mark Rider, 2011. "Cooperating to Resist Coercion: An Experimental Study," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-02, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  • Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2011-02
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    File URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2011-02.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vanessa Mertins, 2008. "Procedural Satisfaction Matters - Procedural Fairness does not: An Experiment Studying the Effects of Procedural Judgments on Outcome Acceptance," IAAEG Discussion Papers until 2011 200807, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
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    Cited by:

    1. Elena Cettolin & Arno Riedl, 2011. "Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 3556, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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