Social Distance and Reciprocity
Contrary to the predictions of non-cooperative game theory, trust and reciprocity are commonly reported in simple games. We conduct a one-shot investment game to examine how social distance affects behavior in two-person exchanges. Two aspects of social distance are examined: ex post revelation of complete information on the second playerÃ¢??s choice set and ex post revelation of information regarding the second playerÃ¢??s identity. The results indicate that reciprocity is not affected by knowledge of the choice set, but depends critically on the possible revelation of the decision makerÃ¢??s identity. That is, the possibility that the second playerÃ¢??s identity (picture) is revealed to his/her counterpart has a profound effect on the degree of reciprocity extended.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (404) 651-3990
Fax: (404) 651-3996
Web page: http://excen.gsu.edu/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (J. Todd Swarthout)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.