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Abstract
Institutions make commitments continuously — targets, pledges, standards, strategies, reform programmes — and fail to keep them at a rate that no account based on insincerity or incompetence can explain. This paper argues the failure is architectural: most institutional commitments are declarative rather than binding, and nothing in their construction obliges future action. We define Commitment and Enforcement Architecture (CEA) as the structures that convert a commitment from a statement into a constraint, and specify what binding requires: five primitives — persistence, constraint, non-bypassability, verification and consequence — each with an observable failure signature. A commitment missing any one is not weakly binding; it is not binding at all. Performative governance — commitment proliferation without constraint — is then shown to be a stable equilibrium rather than a lapse. Where the expected cost of making a commitment is low because the probability it later binds is low, making more of them is rational, and the institution doing so is indistinguishable from a committed one on every observable except compliance. ⭐ The economics of credible commitment says reputation should prevent this, and the answer is why it does not here. A reputational penalty requires breach to be observed, attributed and repeated against the same actor. Long-horizon institutional pledges satisfy none of the three. Binding architecture is what substitutes for repetition where repetition is unavailable. Intent, learning, transparency, incentives and collective self-regulation are each insufficient, for a specific structural reason in each case. Encoding a binding commitment instead involves rules rather than plans, non-discretionary triggers, scope fixed in advance, and a revision process deliberately harder than the evasion it replaces. ⚠️ Two limits, stated rather than left to the reader. The five primitives are necessary conditions on construction, not sufficient for the outcome the commitment was adopted for. And an institution benefiting from the present equilibrium has no reason to bind itself, so binding architecture is predicted to arrive through external pressure rather than reform.
Suggested Citation
Roshan Ghadamian, 2026.
"Commitment Without Binding: Why Institutional Promises Fail, and What Binding Requires,"
IRSA Working Papers
cea-cwb, Institute for Regenerative Systems Architecture.
Handle:
RePEc:evk:wpaper:cea-cwb
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.6116448
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JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
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