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Consumption Externalities in a Ramsey Model

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  • Riham Barbar

    () (EPEE, University of Evry Val d'Essonne)

  • Jean-Paul Barinci

    () (EPEE, University of Evry Val d'Essonne)

Abstract

This chapter studies the e¤ect of consumption externalities on stability properties of a Ramsey model with heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraints. Agents di¤er in their initial wealth, felicity functions and discount factors. For simplicity, heterogeneity is reduced to two groups. Agents are identical within each group. In order to capture the role of heterogeneity as well as external e¤ects, we introduce intergroup and in- tragroup consumption externalities. In this setting, we show that the most patient agent holds the entire capital stock at the steady-state whereas the other agent (impatient) consumes his wage-income. Our main result is that, whenever the preferences display keeping up with the Joneses feature with respect to intergroup externalities, the appearance of two-period cy- cles does not require the relaxation of Income Monotonicity Assumption. Instead, only the external e¤ects in consumption from the other group that plays a crucial role for the appearance of these cycles.

Suggested Citation

  • Riham Barbar & Jean-Paul Barinci, 2010. "Consumption Externalities in a Ramsey Model," Documents de recherche 10-11, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:eve:wpaper:10-11
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    File URL: http://epee.univ-evry.fr/RePEc/2010/10-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consumption externalities; borrowing constraints; hetero- geneous agents; Indeterminacy; Bifurcations;

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General

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