Competition and Reputation
In this paper the authors analyze the interaction of two disciplinary mechanisms: competition and reputation. They first study a dynamic model of monopolistic competition with experiencs goods (i.e., quality is observed after goods are purchased). When market power is high enough, reputation results in the equilibrium with perfect information being sustainable.
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|Date of creation:||1999|
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