Electronic Money: Sustaining Low Inflation
We analyze the impact of electronic money competition on policy outcomes. We consider di®erent assumptions regarding the objectives of the central bank and its ability to commit to future policies. Electronic money competition can discipline a revenue maximizing government and result in lower equilibrium in°ation rates, even when there is imperfect commitment. The e±cient Friedman rule is only implemented if the government maximizes welfare. However electronic money competition may result in the Friedman rule being non credible. We also show how an indepen- dent choice of the reserve requirements can be an e®ective policy rule to enhance the disciplinary role of electronic money compe- tition.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1998|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco98/15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhoda Lane)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.