Coalitions in International Monetary Policy Games
A well-known result from the analysis of the monetary policy coordination of two countries is that coordination of the two policies pareto-dominates the outcome of the non-cooperative game. Hence, both countries will always have an incentive to form a Union when it is ensured that the other country joins it as well. We show in a n-country (symmetric) framework that the two-country result cannot be extended straightforwardly.
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco96/07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhoda Lane)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.