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Coalitions in International Monetary Policy Games


  • Kohler, M


A well-known result from the analysis of the monetary policy coordination of two countries is that coordination of the two policies pareto-dominates the outcome of the non-cooperative game. Hence, both countries will always have an incentive to form a Union when it is ensured that the other country joins it as well. We show in a n-country (symmetric) framework that the two-country result cannot be extended straightforwardly.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohler, M, 1996. "Coalitions in International Monetary Policy Games," Economics Working Papers eco96/07, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco96/07

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1992. "Evolution and market behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 9-40, October.
    2. Megiddo, Nimrod, 1989. "On computable beliefs of rational machines," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 144-169, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marion Kohler, 1998. "Optimal currency areas and customs unions: are they connected?," Bank of England working papers 89, Bank of England.

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    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory


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