Delegation and Coordination in Fiscal-Monetary Policy Games: Implementation of the Best Feasible Equilibrium
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- Florin Bilbiie & D. Stasavage, 2005.
"Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement,"
- Florin Bilbiie & David Stasavage, 2005. "Incomplete Fiscal Rules with Imperfect Enforcement," Economics Papers 2005-W12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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