Signaling and indirect taxation
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KeywordsOptimal Taxation; Indirect Taxation; Costly Signaling; Identity.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-12-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-PUB-2010-12-23 (Public Finance)
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