A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons
In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://feb.kuleuven.be/Economics/|
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