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Legacy of the Gandhian Approaches: Vinoba to Obama


  • Hemali Sanghavi



Centre for Gandhian Studies of K.J.Somaiya College of Arts and Commerce organized One-day Seminar on the Legacy of the Gandhian Approaches: Vinoba to Obama on 24 February, 2011.

Suggested Citation

  • Hemali Sanghavi, 2011. "Legacy of the Gandhian Approaches: Vinoba to Obama," Working Papers id:3805, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3805 Note: Conference Papers

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Booth,Alison L., 1994. "The Economics of the Trade Union," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521468398, March.
    2. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "Optimal Intervention in an Economy with Trade Unions," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 221, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. Emmanuel Petrakis & Minas Vlassis, 2004. "Endogenous wage bargaining institutions in oligopolistic sectors," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 55-73, July.
    4. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
    5. M. Ryan Haley, 2003. "The Response of Worker Effort to Piece Rates: Evidence from the Midwest Logging Industry," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 38(4).
    6. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    7. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
    8. Kraft, Kornelius, 1998. "The codetermined firm in oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 195-201, November.
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