Domestic supply, job-specialisation and sex-differences in pay
This paper proposes an explanation of sex-differences in job-allocation and pay. Job allocation calculations are considered to be related to 1) the distribution of housework and 2) the skill-specialization requirements of jobs. Both elements combined generate a particular incentive structure for each sex. Welfare policies and services can, however, lower the risks of skill-depreciation for women as well as increase their intra-household bargaining power, hence reducing the economic pay-offs of â€œtraditionalâ€ spherespecialization by sex. The implications of this model for earnings are tested using data from the second round of the European Social Survey. Results seem consistent with the model predictions.
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