Gefährdete Wahlen, geforderte Union: Die EU und der Fall Rumänien 2024

This master thesis explores how attempts of foreign influence on the Romanian presidential election of 2024 are treated in the EU discourse regarding security and integration policy. My point of departure is the increasing pressure democratic elections suffer from hybrid threats, such as disinformation, manipulative social media campaigns and potential foreign interference. Against this background, I examine how the Romanian example is discussed as a pattern for hybrid threats endangering European democracies, and the ensuing political dynamics. In terms of methods, I interpret a plenary debate of the European Parliament and analyse commentaries in the media. My theoretical approach combines Securitization Theory with neo-functional mechanisms of integration to cover both, security policy and possible European spillover consequences. My results show that foreign election interference is taken quite seriously and is considered a threat that requires a coordinated European response. At the same time, it constitutes a politically contested threat assessment: On one hand, the European Commission and a large majority in the European Parliament agree on grounds for concern, on the other, right-wing and national-conservative actors make light of the assault on democracy or blame the victim. Where there is accordance, European cooperation materialises; incongruous interpretations, by contrast, limit progress. Overall, the case of Romania shows that securing democratic processes in the digital age has increasingly become a European endeavour, while being highly dependant on shared perceptions and political majorities.