Explaining the Leadership Vacuum: Germany, the completion of the Banking Union and arms deliveries to Ukraine

While successful leadership in regional and international politics has been analysed and explained at great length, the reasons for its failure are still under-researched. Therefore, we ask in this paper how and why a leadership vacuum comes about. Drawing on rational-functionalist propositions, we argue that the emergence of leadership fails if the realisation of a collective goal requires the would-be leader to compromise their individual interests. Empirically, we apply this argument to Germany’s role in the European Union (EU). While there is little doubt that Germany is in great demand to take the lead, the reasons for its frequent leadership rejection have so far remained in the dark – especially as recent research has shown that the German political elite would actually endorse a leading role for its country in the EU. Based on a fine-grained causal mechanism, the systematic collection and in-depth analysis of 220 media articles, and rigorous process tracing, we therefore compare Germany’s role in two crisis policies: the completion of Europe’s Banking Union – i.e. the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) – and the supply of arms to Ukraine. The results demonstrate in detail how vested interests prevent the provision of leadership that would benefit all. Regarding Germany’s role in Europe, the paper thus highlights why many of the leadership demands directed at the EU’s largest member state might be misled. With regard to leadership research and practice in general, the paper provides an explanation for leadership vacuums in international politics and cautions against treating leadership as an altruistic sacrifice.