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The Normality of Constitutional Politics: an Analysis of the Drafting of the EU Charta of Fundamental Rights

Listed author(s):
  • Richard Bellamy
  • Justus Schoenlau
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    Constitutional politics is often contrasted with normal politics as being more deliberative and so able to produce a principled consensus rather than a compromise. This article qualifies this view. The authors argue that the potential exists for reasonable disagreement even over such basic constitutional principles as rights. As a result, a constitution can only be agreed by employing the art of compromise typical of normal politics. Indeed, a prime role of constitutional politics lies in showing how conflicts can be normalised. The authors illustrate their argument via a detailed analysis of the various political compromises employed by the convention to draft the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

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    Paper provided by University of Hamburg, Faculty for Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Science in its series The Constitutionalism Web-Papers with number p0027.

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    Date of creation: 31 Dec 2003
    Handle: RePEc:erp:conweb:p0027
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