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Institutional Stimulation of Deliberative Decision-Making:Technical Regulation in the European Union

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  • Thomas Gehring
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    Institutions based upon the systematic separation of different decision functions may stimulate deliberative decision-making, if they hinder negotiators from introducing their bargaining power into the negotiation process. Such arrangements exist for the regulation of requirements for health and safety of products within the Single Market. The article explores the underlying causal mechanism and examines the cases of machines and toys. This working paper develops a theoretical concept of functionally differentiated decision-making and derive from it an arrangement which provides strong incentives for actors to shift from power-based bargaining to reason-based arguing. We find such an arrangement in the so-called “New Approach” to European governance in the Single Market, which separates the elaboration of basic health and safety requirements from their application to numerous products and groups of products.

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    Paper provided by ARENA in its series ARENA Working Papers with number 6.

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    Date of creation: 27 Mar 2007
    Handle: RePEc:erp:arenax:p0234
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