Logics of Decision-making on Community Asylum Policy: A Case Study of the Evolvement of the Dublin II Regulation
This case study of the evolvement of the so-called Dublin II Regulation on asylum demonstrates the role of Council-specific informal rules and procedures in facilitating intergovernmental agreement. The paper addresses a Rationalist "puzzle", namely the question why the Justice and Home Affairs Council reached political agreement on Dublin II in spite of the Regulation's likely redistributive effects on the number of asylum applications processed by individual Member States. The empirical material suggests that issue-linkage, informal decision-making procedures, and a strong reluctance on the part of Council members to exercise their right to veto are jointly sufficient conditions for reaching political agreement.
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