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Benevolence Based Trust And Agency Relations Among Upper Echelons Of Family-Owned Firms

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Listed:
  • CRISTINA CRUZ

    () (Instituto de Empresa)

  • LUIS GOMEZ - MEJIA

    () (Instituto de Empresa)

  • MANUEL BECERRA

    () (Instituto de Empresa)

Abstract

We investigate how the family status of owners, CEO, and top management team (TMT) determine CEO´s perceptions regarding the benevolence of his/her TMT and how in turn these perceptions of benevolence-based trust influence the nature of TMT control and incentive mechanisms. Using a sample of 122 Spanish firms, we find that CEOs´ assessment of TMT benevolence in family firms is more positive when (a) the CEO is a family member and the family is in a stronger ownership position; (b) there is greater similarity in family status between CEO and top managers and (c) environmental turbulence is low.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Cruz & Luis Gomez - Mejia & Manuel Becerra, 2005. "Benevolence Based Trust And Agency Relations Among Upper Echelons Of Family-Owned Firms," Working Papers Economia wp05-23, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment.
  • Handle: RePEc:emp:wpaper:wp05-23
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    10. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
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