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Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Short-Run Players

Author

Listed:
  • Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo

    (Division of Economics, CIDE)

Abstract

This paper studies cooperative behavior in communities with a subset of short-run players. This is done in the context of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The introduction of a short-run player in the population breaks any equilibrium supported by symmetric pure strategies. Despite this, I suggest a plausible information technology that ensures a cooperative outcome by identifying the cooperative members of a community. This technology resembles the informational institutions that allow firms to recognize clients and to make them recognizable for other firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Short-Run Players," Working papers DTE 490, CIDE, División de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:emc:wpaper:dte490
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economiamexicana.cide.edu/RePEc/emc/pdf/DTE/DTE490.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo & Lucia Quesada & Marcela Tarazona, 2013. "Cooperation among Strangers in the Presence of Defectors: An Experimental Study," Working papers DTE 567, CIDE, División de Economía.
    2. Luciana Cecilia Moscoso Boedo, 2009. "Labels for Misbehavior in a Population with Short-Run Players," Working papers DTE 468, CIDE, División de Economía.
    3. Luciana C Moscoso Boedo & Antonio Jimenez-Martinez, 2015. "Identifying defectors in a population with short-run players," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1392-1403.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    prisioner's dilemma; short-run players; cooperative members;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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