Preferencias sociales, cooperación y desarrollo financiero: un experimento de campo
In this article, we evaluate the relationship and the interaction between financial development, grades of cooperation, in terms of trust and reciprocity, and participation in social networks of the members of a savings and loan association. We used exchanged money quantities according to the trust-game experimental protocol, as approximate measures of the social interrelation categories noted above. We estimated the dependency of the transfers done in the game with the socioeconomic characteristics of the participants and their link with different social groups (i.e. family, acquaintances and government). We also investigate the relevance of the purchase of information about other participants in the experiment as instruments that facilitate or hinder cooperation relations. Preliminary results indicate that those individuals who visit more regularly their acquaintances and also have a bank account, have shown a greater willingness to trust other individuals giving resources, with the possibility of a future return. In contrast to this result, those individuals who attend more regularly to their relatives show less willingness to reciprocate in return sending smaller amounts of money. The active members of the association show greater reciprocity. Regarding the acquisition of information about other participants, we found that slightly more than 2/3 of the participants buy the maximum of five pieces of information. However, none of the acquired pieces of information seem to affect the final amount sent between the participants.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2008|
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