The Redistributive Role of Non-profit Organizations
By starting from the consideration that non-profit organizations cover a significant redistributive function beside that of governmental agencies, the paper questions why government prefers to finance via transfers private entities (lucrative and non-lucrative) rather than produce these goods directly. By generalizing the Hansmann (1986) theory we propose a ìmake or buyî approach in which the choice among three different ownership regimes (governmental, non- profit and for-profit) providing services in public benefit-oriented sectors is affected not only by costs reduction (X-efficiency) but also by the level of transfers (degree of ìuniversalismî) decided at a political level.
|Date of creation:||2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Chalé dos Catedráticos, 1. Avda. das Ciencias s/n. Campus Vida, 15782 Santiago de Compostela|
Phone: 981 59 11 66
Fax: 981 59 99 35
Web page: http://www.usc.es/idega/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Giovanni Cerulli, 2006. "Una Matrice di Contabilità Sociale per il welfare mix: l'integrazione del settore non-profit. Prime verifiche empiriche ed effetti occupazionali per l'Italia," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 96(2), pages 79-128, March-Apr.
- Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
- John C. McManus, 1975. "The Costs of Alternative Economic Organizations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 8(3), pages 334-50, August.
- Chillemi, Ottorino & Gui, Benedetto, 1991. "Uninformed customers and nonprofit organization : Modelling 'contract failure' theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 5-8, January.
- Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-49, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edg:anecon:0036. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manuel Fernandez Grela)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.