A Product Market Theory of Training in Firms
We develop a product market theory explaining why firms invest in general training of their workers and managers. We consider a model where firms first decide whether to invest in general human capital, then make wage offers for the trained employees in the market and finally engage in product market competition. Multiple equilibria can emerge, with and without training. Unlike existing theories of general training, our approach does not require asymmetric information on the labor market. Firms train, if others do the same, because they would otherwise suffer a competitive disadvantage or have to pay high wages to poach workers. In the case of worker training, government intervention can be socially desirable to turn training into a focal equilibrium.
|Date of creation:||01 Aug 2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1744. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.