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Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining and the Deadline Effect

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  • Robert Evans

    (St. John's College)

Abstract

A one-shot simultaneous-offers bargaining game is presented in which the unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the infinite-horizon Rubinstein alternating-offers game. For each player there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not arrive. A finitely-repeated version of the game with a small amount of (two-sided) incomplete information about disagreement payoffs is then used to explain the deadline effect. In any pure strategy equilibrium of this game agreement is reached only in the final period.\vspace{0.2in}

Suggested Citation

  • Robert Evans, 2000. "Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining and the Deadline Effect," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1716, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:1716
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