IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Experimental Study of Information in Bargaining


  • Muriel Niederle
  • Guillaume Frechette
  • Uri Gneezy


Scores of experimental studies in two player bargaining games have shown the importance of fair outcomes in complete information environments. However, the case of complete information may be a special case, both in terms of the amount of information the players have, and the fact that they can compare relative profits from trade. Our new design allows us to manipulate the information a bargainer has about the value of a trade for the other party. The results of the experiments permit us to identify the value of information for each party, and its role in determining efficiency and the distribution of profits. We also discuss the importance of fairness when players lack information about each others payoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Muriel Niederle & Guillaume Frechette & Uri Gneezy, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Information in Bargaining," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 655, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:655

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item




    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:655. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.