An Experimental Study of Information in Bargaining
Scores of experimental studies in two player bargaining games have shown the importance of fair outcomes in complete information environments. However, the case of complete information may be a special case, both in terms of the amount of information the players have, and the fact that they can compare relative profits from trade. Our new design allows us to manipulate the information a bargainer has about the value of a trade for the other party. The results of the experiments permit us to identify the value of information for each party, and its role in determining efficiency and the distribution of profits. We also discuss the importance of fairness when players lack information about each others payoffs.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.aspEmail:
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:655. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.