A Model of Gossip
This paper analyzes how the gossip process can be manipulated by biased people and the impact of such manipulation on information transmission. In this model, a single piece of information is transmitted via a chain of agents with privately known types. Each agent may be either objective or biased, with the latter type aiming to manipulate the information transmitted toward a given direction. In an indirect impact gossip model where all agents aim to influence a final decisionmaker, the biased type's equilibrium incentive to make up wrong information is independent of their position in the gossip chain. Moreover, adding just a few biased people to the population sharply decreases the amount of information transmitted. In a direct impact gossip model where every biased agent is concerned about influencing his immediate listener, gossip causes initial contamination of data, but eventually dies out as the objective people stop listening
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:612. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.