Tax-Price Competition for Internationalized Public Goods
According to globalization, certain kinds of public goods, which used to be working as the goods just in a national economy, are getting internationalized or released for foreigners as well. In addition, those goods often exhibit differentiated features for a certain degree. The goods as such are therefore quite different by nature from the international collective or public goods in the literature. We explore the financing scheme for such kind of internationalized public goods, by a simple model of two countries competing each other with taxing and pricing. Our main results are; 1) The more populated the foreign country, the better off the home country if the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently high, or the foreign is sufficiently populated. Otherwise it may not; 2) While it is distorted by the governmental incentives to utilize foreigners as financial resources, the welfare in a Nash equilibrium is always better than that gained by autarky for any relative size of population and for any degree of differentiation; 3) While, in standard theory of game or oligopoly, more limited strategies for players tend to provide better off in equilibrium as a paradoxical consequence, discriminatory-pricing equilibrium here is better off for sufficiently larger country rather than more limited, uniform pricing scheme
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:443. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.