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Welfare Properties of Network Bypass

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  • Richard Martin

Abstract

One result of the deregulation of utilities in New Zealand has been the bypass of existing networks. We investigate two cases of bypass in the distribution of natural gas, and compare the welfare properties of regulation vs.\ the `laissez-faire' equilibrium. We demonstrate that installing a redundant bypass can be simultaneously profitable and socially undesirable. Bypass is costly, but it reduces market power and increases the variety of goods available to consumers. Regulation is an alternative mechanism to discipline the behavior of the incumbent, but provides no variety to consumers. We find that desirability of the two regulatory regimes depends critically on the degree of differentiation between the existing and potential network. Both marginal and average cost price regulation are considered

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Martin, 2004. "Welfare Properties of Network Bypass," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 22, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:ausm04:22
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; entry; welfare; efficiency; CES;

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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