Market Frictions, Governance and Economic Rents: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead
This paper develops a more unified organizational economics theory within Strategy. We begin with perfectly competitive markets derived from the first fundamental welfare theorem of economics, and develop a parsimonious typology of market frictions. We show how two primary questions in Strategy--why firms exist and why some firms outperform others--can be evaluated from this market frictions logic. Building on this logic enables more systematic explanations and predictions concerning governance structures and economic rents in Strategy research.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/Working_Papers/Main.asp|
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