Moral Hazard in a model of Bank Run with Noisy Signals
We show that multiple equilibria exist in a model of bank run with moral hazard. Furthermore, this is true even with noisy signals on the economic fundamentals. We argue that the conditions under which this happens can arise naturally in models of banking with moral hazard problem.
|Date of creation:||04 Jun 2003|
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