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Creative Destruction and Innovative Core: Is Innovation Persistent at the Firm Level? An empirical reexamination from CIS data comparing the propensity score and regression methods

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  • Duguet, Emmanuel

    (University of Bretagne)

  • StÈphanie Monjon

    (University Paris 1)

Abstract

At the macroeconomic level, the persistence of innovation allows sustainable growth. But does growth come from the same set of firms or originate always from different innovators? On this point, the assumptions of endogenous growth models differ and innovation persistence at the macroeconomic level can be supported by different firm-level behavioural assumptions. The aim of this article is twofold. First, we evaluate the empirical pertinence of the different views of the dynamics of the innovative process by estimating the degree of innovation persistence at the firm level. Secondly, we explore the determinants of innovation persistence by testing the empirical implications of three theoretical models. We show that the innovation persistence is essential at the firm level and that the origin of the persistence depends on the size of the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Duguet, Emmanuel & StÈphanie Monjon, 2002. "Creative Destruction and Innovative Core: Is Innovation Persistent at the Firm Level? An empirical reexamination from CIS data comparing the propensity score and regression methods," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 68, Royal Economic Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2002:68
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    Cited by:

    1. William R. Latham & Christian Le Bas, 2005. " Persistence of Firm Innovative Behavior: Towards an Evolutionary Theory," Working Papers 05-14, University of Delaware, Department of Economics.
    2. Rammer, Christian & Schubert, Torben, 2016. "Concentration on the few? R&D and innovation in German firms 2001 to 2013," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-005, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Emmanuel Duguet & Stéphanie Monjon, 2004. "Is innovation persistent at the firm Level . An econometric examination comparing the propensity score and regression methods," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques v04075, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

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