IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eca/wpaper/2013-406226.html

Why Patent Applications Fail: Quantifying The Role Of Economic Forces

Author

Listed:
  • Elise Petit
  • Bruno Van Pottelsberghe

Abstract

This paper introduces a new economic perspective on why patent applications fail. Using new data based on the content of patent office communications in 4,590 patent applications filed simultaneously in Europe, Japan, and the United States, it estimates that a third of non-granted applications are withdrawals likely caused by economic factors. Econometric models find that the economic factor is significantly more prevalent at the EPO and when the same invention is granted elsewhere. The prevalence of economic withdrawals questions the use of grant rates as indicators of examination stringency and underscores the need for broader applicant-based measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Elise Petit & Bruno Van Pottelsberghe, 2026. "Why Patent Applications Fail: Quantifying The Role Of Economic Forces," Working Papers ECARES 2026-13, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/406226
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/406226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benoit Pauwels (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/arulbbe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.