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Effective knowledge transfer in family firms


  • Trevinyo-Rodríguez, Rosa N.

    (ITESM, Monterrey)

  • Tapies, Josep

    () (IESE Business School)


One of the most critical organizational changes family businesses deal with at some stage in their lives is the succession process. When evaluating it, two main targets are sought: quality and effectiveness. To meet these quality-effectiveness standards three elements should be transferred from the predecessor to the Next Generation Member(s): 1) Ownership/power, 2) Management responsibility and 3) Competence/Knowledge. We focus on the third element: Knowledge, since most of the times, it is "the taken-for-granted" factor. How effective intergenerational knowledge transfer in family firms takes place -under which conditions and through which variables- is the heart of this writing. We have developed a Knowledge Transfer Model in Family Firms (KTFF) which sets on stage several internal and external relationships in the Family-Enterprise-Next Generation System. And, although this is a conceptual text, it may drive future empirical research projects in order to provide support for the proposed interactions (relationships).

Suggested Citation

  • Trevinyo-Rodríguez, Rosa N. & Tapies, Josep, 2010. "Effective knowledge transfer in family firms," IESE Research Papers D/865, IESE Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0865

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr & Petter Vegard Hansen, 2010. "Electricity Retailing in Norway," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 25-46.
    2. Von Der Fehr, N.H.M. & Harbord, D., 1992. "Long-Tern Contracts and Imperfectly Competitive Spot Markets : A Study of U.K. Electricity Industry," Memorandum 14/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    3. van Damme, Eric & Hurkens, Sjaak, 1997. "Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 282-308, October.
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    More about this item


    Knowledge Transfer; Learning; Knowledge Acquisition; Family Firms; Family Business; Next Generation; Succession;

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