IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Regulatory induced herding? Evidence from Polish pension funds

  • Zbigniew Kominek


    (European Bank of Reconstruction and Development)

Registered author(s):

    The paper documents herding among pension fund managers in Poland. Herding occurs despite the lack of an economically significant link between fund performance and the flow of new capital or members. To explain this phenomenon, the paper outlines a model that attributes herding to performance incentive contracts imposed by the authorities in Poland. The model shows that penalties for underperformance imposed by the regulator are likely to cause fund managers to follow each other’s portfolio choices and pursue similar investment strategies. Since herding causes similar portfolio allocations by all funds, the results call for a reduction in the number of funds, or a review of the relative performance incentive system and current constraints on portfolio allocation. The latter could also help reduce the dominance of government bonds in investment portfolios of pension funds.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office of the Chief Economist in its series Working Papers with number 96.

    in new window

    Length: 24 pages
    Date of creation: Jun 2006
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ebd:wpaper:96
    Contact details of provider: Postal: One Exchange Square, London EC2A 2JN
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebd:wpaper:96. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Olga Lucas)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.