Economic transition, firm organisation and internal control: determinants of audit structure in Russian firms
With a unique dataset of joint-stock companies, this paper describes the corporate audit structure in Russia and empirically analyses its determinants. When compared to the international standard, Russian firms have a weak audit structure in terms of the independence and expertise of the board of auditors and the accounting auditor. We found that board composition, affiliation with a business group and presence of foreign investors are the most important factors determining the audit structure of Russian firms. The scope of the impact of these three factors, however, differed considerably. We also found that government ownership, company size, fund procurement activities and overseas advancement have significant effects on the corporate audit structure in Russia.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2011|
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- S. Avdasheva, 2007. "Russian Holding Groups: New Empirical Evidence," Problems of Economic Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 50(5), pages 24-43, September.
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"Organizational Culture and Corporate Governance in Russia : A Study of Managerial Turnover,"
RRC Working Paper Series
21, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
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