This paper is a short, non-technical exposition of the political economy of protection. It asks how do political forces operate to generate protection, and what determines the magnitude and form that protection takes.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE, edited by Charles K. Rowley.|
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