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Esternalita' di rete: una riformulazione del modello di Fukao in termini di giochi supermodulari

Author

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  • Elena Dobici

    () (Facoltà di Economia dell’Università degli Studi della Tuscia)

Abstract

Coordination failures are very important in imperfect markets, because of related concept of multiple equilibria. This article attempts to explore this topic using tools to overcome the limitations of traditional analytical apparatus, which imposes stringent conditions about functions and strategy sets. The paper reports the general concepts of global games, summarizes the key findings of a global game with network externalities developed by K. Fukao and esplicates the basic concepts of lattice theory and supermodular games. In the reformulation of Fukao model the work uses a no-convex strategy set: it provides existence of at least an equilibrium and obtains result with easier calculation. The lattice-theoretic methodology is applied to study multiple equilibria in a greater class of models.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Dobici, 2010. "Esternalita' di rete: una riformulazione del modello di Fukao in termini di giochi supermodulari," Working Papers 9, Doctoral School of Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, revised 2010.
  • Handle: RePEc:dsc:wpaper:9
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    File URL: http://phdschool-economics.dse.uniroma1.it/website/workingpapers/dobiciwp9.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network externalities; Coordination failures; Lattice theory; Supermodular games;

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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